The current conflict in Sudan can be understood as a domestic dispute between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (SAF) and Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (RSF), who both lead Sudan’s military factions and are unwilling to cede their influence to each other, especially to the Sudanese people2. Understanding the conflict today means understanding the circumstances that brought forth this unstable constellation, as well as the domestic issues that have led to this dire outlook for Sudan.

One man’s legacy

Sudan’s current turmoil cannot be solely attributed to one individual, as the nation’s challenges stem from a complex historical context. However, the actions of Omar al-Bashir have played a pivotal role in shaping the country’s trajectory and conflict today3. On June 30, 1989, Omar al-Bashir, then a military officer, orchestrated a military coup that overthrew the Sudanese government. Unlike previous military coups, al-Bashir did not maintain the facade of "wanting to establish a civilian government" or "holding democratic elections." Instead, he immediately dissolved the Sudanese parliament and banned all political parties, laying the foundations of his military regime.

For the majority of Sudan’s history, or to be exact, for 52 of its 65 years of independence, the military has held control of the country4. Omar Al-Bashir’s regime not only cemented this status but continued to build on it and further entrenched the Sudanese Armed Forces into government institutions and the domestic economy. But Omar Al-Bashir was not stupid – “he knew that statistically, if one were to gain power through a coup, they’d be likely to lose power to a coup,” says Hager Ali, a doctoral fellow at GIGA Hamburg.

So as part of his coup-proofing strategy, Al-Bashir bet on compartmentalisation of the military’s competences, as Hager Ali’s research revealed5. When rebellions broke out in Darfur in 2003 and the SAF was spread thin, Al-Bashir’s regime resorted to funding local militias with proceeds of the country’s vast natural resources, utilizing ethnic tensions in order to respond to the revolts6. These militias were known as the Janjaweed, and they would set out to commit one of the worst genocides in 21st-century history78. Out of the Janjaweed emerged the Rapid Support Forces. While the Sudan Armed Forces have historically served as a talent pool for government roles in Khartoum, and would continue to do so, the newly founded paramilitary group RSF would focus on counterinsurgency.

This balancing act of rivaling powers created an inherently unstable situation and would eventually prove futile when both factions ousted Al-Bashir on April 11, 2019. The incredible pressure from the democratization movement of the Sudanese people, as well as a depressing economic outlook under Al-Bashir’s rule, led to the RSF and SAF combining their forces in a coup d’état. “With Daglo (RSF) coming to Khartoum to join the transitional military council, the artificial separation of competences, with the Sudanese Armed Forces as the government force in Khartoum and the Rapid Support Forces as solely responsible for counterinsurgency in the periphery, had ended,” said Hager Ali.

A stolen revolution

The democratization of Sudan still faces several challenges. While Al-Bashir was ousted, his institutional legacies remain. Sudan does not have a point of reference for democratic institutions and, as in the past, must start from scratch in building a civilian government. Meanwhile, the split military factions of the country, namely the SAF and RSF, not only have to worry about their status in a democratic Sudan — which they would never willingly give up — but also deal with potential coups from other cells within the Sudanese security apparatus.

After Al-Bashir's ousting, a Transitional Military Council (TMC) was established with the goal of restoring full civilian rule. Yet in the midst of this progression, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) took full control in 2021. Facing international and domestic pressure, negotiations with civilian parties for democratization would continue, but ultimately fail at the security reform, which would entail the RSF being integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces9. If enforced, it would have essentially led to the Rapid Support Forces giving up all autonomy, as well as the benefits it entails – such as the personal enrichment through the control of gold mines in Darfur. As the negotiations on the reform stalled, tensions rose and eventually led to the fighting we see in Sudan today.

Fighting originally broke out in Khartoum, but the warfare now encompasses the entire country. “The current war can be characterized as modern trench warfare,” Hager Ali said. “While one party may be able to achieve small victories on one front, it is difficult to attribute overall victories to either side. In a war of attrition, it’s really not about firepower but the ability to sustain continuous fighting.” Her research reveals that, in order to do so, both parties are increasingly relying on recruiting local militias, exploiting existing ethnic tensions, offering bounties, or threatening violence. There have even been reports of the deployment of child soldiers10. The limited resources of both parties still somewhat restrict the territorial extent of the warfare. The localization and fragmentation of this war have led to numerous human rights violations, such as genocide and the pillaging of civilian villages, as the parties struggle to enforce their military commands on a local level to control newly recruited troops, as Hager describes in her paper (which you can find here).

The war has now become about either party implementing their vision for Sudan. As the SAF has already been an important player in Sudan for decades, the RSF has to catch up in building the infrastructure to legitimize itself domestically and even internationally. Naturally, this conflict has become a playground for regional players to project power. The RSF has received and continues to receive significant logistical support from the United Arab Emirates, for whom the gold trade out of Sudan is crucial. The UAE imports more gold from African states than their total official export records would indicate, which is also true for Sudan. Moderate estimates attribute around 80% of Sudan’s gold exports to illegal smuggling to the UAE11. The Russian Wagner Group also plays an important role in logistical support, as for them Sudan is just another piece in the puzzle for Africa12. There have even been reports of meetings between Daglo and Israeli Intelligence, as the Sudanese Red Sea coast poses an interesting geopolitical and economic asset to Israel13.

After a year of fighting, the outlook for the situation improving is grim. "The RSF's self-perception as a victor prevents them from joining the SAF in negotiations for a potential power-sharing situation," explains Hager Ali. As long as both parties continue to receive logistical support and consider their outlook on absolute victory promising, Al-Burhan and Dagalo will probably not settle their power dispute peacefully. All the while, the Sudanese civil population is suffering under mass displacement and facing starvation, especially since humanitarian aid is held hostage by the SAF or RSF in order to weaken areas held by the other respective party.

As the situation in Sudan is primarily a domestic issue, the capabilities of outside actors are limited. It is essential to cut off the RSF and SAF from arms shipments and their financial infrastructures. Humanitarian aid to the refugees who have fled to neighboring countries needs to be increased. Even though all eyes in the region are currently on Gaza, Sudan should not be forgotten in the international dialogue.

Big thank you to Hager Ali, who has provided many important insights and whose research has been crucial in understanding the situation in Sudan. You can find all of her publications and links here.

From Pharmaceutical Wonder to Illicit Stimulant

Captagon was originally the brand name for Fenethylline, a chemical first synthesized in West Germany in the early 1960s. It was a combination of amphetamine and theophylline^[3], created as an alternative to the known stimulants at the time. It was primarily prescribed to treat ADHD, but it quickly found favor among students as a “smart drug” – marketed for its supposed lack of common side effects seen with similar substances. At one point, it was said that every other soccer player in the German Bundesliga was using captagon^[4]. However, by the late 1980s, it became clear that captagon had an incredibly addictive nature and led to harmful side effects, such as the gradual decay of personality/consciousness, hallucinations, and even death, which is why it got banned in most countries^[5]. The illegally manufactured and sold captagon pills found on the market today are quite different from the original formulation, with Fenethylline no longer a component. Instead, they are mainly made up of amphetamines and caffeine, although their exact composition tends to vary. The appearance of these pills can change, but they are typically recognizable by the distinct “C” imprint on each pill. This unique marking has earned the pills the nickname “Abu Hilalein,” which translates to “father of two crescents^[6].”

Examining the captagon trade in Arab Asia

To truly understand the scope of the captagon trade in Arab Asia, the team at OPENSYR took it upon themselves to construct an independent database of drug seizures throughout the region. This step became necessary as the data reported by governments to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)—often the primary source for such information—tends to be incomplete or inaccurate, as they rely on comprehensive reports from the individual governments. OPENSYR put together individual reports by organizations in order to circumvent this process. To gauge the prevalence of different narcotics, we operate under the assumption that each drug has an equal chance of being intercepted.

Figure 1 reveals a telling shift in the Middle East’s drug landscape. Historically, cannabis resin (hashish) reigned as the undisputed substance of choice. Yet, in recent years, captagon has surged, claiming the top spot alongside hashish. This immense growth is not just a statistical quirk; it speaks volumes when analyzed alongside data from addiction treatment facilities. A staggering 58% of addicts seeking treatment in Saudi Arabia are grappling with amphetamine-related addictions, highlighting the pervasive grip of captagon. The narcotic’s consumption and subsequent addiction can lead to devastating health effects. Furthermore, the chemical inconsistency of these pills, which are not always only laced with caffeine and can sometimes even contain methamphetamine, poses its own danger^[7]. 

In the comprehensive database compiled by researchers, not all drug seizures specify a country of origin. OPENSYR examined 111 seizures logged between 2016 and 2022 that did indicate this piece of information. 54% of these instances traced the drugs back to regime-held areas in Syria, 6% to Lebanon, and 4.5% to either of the locations. Moreover, the trail becomes even clearer with captagon: a staggering 86% of seizures are linked to either regime-held Syria or Lebanon, with a definitive 72% traced back to Syrian regions under government control, leaving 14% undetermined. It is clear the organizations responsible for the publication of seizures have become increasingly wary in reporting this crucial information. This trend could indicate smugglers’ improved skill in disguising their sources, or it may stem from shifts in domestic policy to avoid intense scrutiny on the parties responsible for the captagon boom. 

So, why do Lebanon and Syria emerge as central figures in Middle Eastern drug production?
Several factors compound to create a perfect storm for illicit manufacturing. Both countries’ battered economies translate into lower production costs, thanks to cheaper labor. The rampant corruption and lax enforcement of laws, in contrast to the rigorous crackdowns on illegal drugs in Gulf nations, provide a breeding ground for organized criminal activities. The official stance of the Syrian government is that “terrorist” groups within the country are responsible for the growing narcotics trade, using it as a source of funding for their operations. Supposedly, national defense forces have uncovered copious amounts of drugs while seizing areas held by these “terrorists.” However, we have already discovered that most narcotics seizures in Arab Asia are traced back to the regime-held Syria, which indicates that the narrative spread by the Syrian regime is highly questionable. 

Captagon production in Syria

The team at OPENSYR has identified 36 key production hubs of captagon, all located within Syria. It is important to mention that some smaller facilities are significantly mobile, often shifting between the Syrian-Lebanese border when there is an elevated risk of getting caught. However, most of these hubs continue to operate within Syria’s borders.

The Daraa government in the south of the country is home to the highest number of captagon-production facilities. Following the Assad regime's recapture of this province in 2018, the number of these facilities has noticeably increased. Daraa is an attractive location because of its uncertain security arrangements, established smuggling networks across the desert border with Jordan, and proximity to consumers in the Gulf. The local parties involved in production and smuggling include the Lebanese Hezbollah and affiliates of the Fourth Armored Division.

In eastern Syria, the Dayr al-Zowr government has become the second-largest center for captagon production due to its proximity to Iraq. Not only does Iraq serve as an alternative smuggling route, but it has also emerged as a significant market for captagon consumption. The Al-Qaim highway, connecting Syria to Iraq, is primarily controlled by Iranian-backed militias, historically known for their involvement in smuggling activities. Given the influence of these militias in both Iraqi and Syrian territories, it's highly likely they are involved in the production and distribution of captagon in the region.

Activities in Homs, which borders Lebanon, have declined as attention has shifted to the other two governorates. The Lebanese Hezbollah and the Fourth Armored Division have a significant influence in this region.

Almost all related facilities are located in regions controlled by organizations that maintain strong alliances with the Syrian regime. Crucial entities such as the Fourth Armored Division, National Defence Forces, and the Military Intelligence Directorate operate under the direct influence of the President. Additionally, the Lebanese Hezbollah, which is a major player in the captagon production, even though ostensibly independent, closely coordinates its activities with the Fourth Armored Division—overseen by Maher al-Assad, the President's brother. The involvement of Iranian-backed militias is noteworthy as well, which prompts critical questions about the depth of the Iranian government's involvement. Possessing vast experience in circumnavigating sanctions and laundering money, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxies could serve as beneficial allies to the captagon syndicate. 

It is worth noting there is one production facility in the Idlib governorate, overseen by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and another four in areas controlled by the Syrian National Army (SNA). Both HTS and SNA are key opposition forces in the Syrian civil war against the Assad regime.

Mapping Syria's Narcotics Network

The second independent database by OPENSYR includes all significant participants in Syria's captagon supply chain, with some involvement from Lebanon. The network has 330 “nodes,” representing private companies, government organizations, customs agents, businesspeople, money launderers, and militias. It also has 458 “edges” representing the connections between these nodes. This approach not only helps pinpoint the main players in the captagon supply chain but highlights the growth stages of the country's narcotics ecosystem by studying the types of relationships formed.

Without identifying a specific timeline, the research posits that the origins of the current narcotics ecosystem can likely be traced back to a small subset of individuals. These initial actors may have received support from authoritative groups such as the Fourth Armored Division, suggesting a close connection between the narcotics trade and Syrian established powers. As time passed, the network expanded, enticing and incorporating other local and marginalized actors. These new relationships were informal and cooperative, pointing towards a network built on shared interests and partnerships. Within this growing ecosystem, certain partnerships evolved dynamically and autonomously, manifesting a degree of flexibility and adaptability. As the ecosystem matured, specific dynamics that contributed toward a more cohesive and developed system surfaced. The presence of power-packed central actors (like Wassem Al-Assad, who plays a role in financing, logistics, and operations), diverse types of players involved (like actors on opposing sides of the Syrian civil war), and the emergence of functional subgroups underscore this stability. Today, the ecosystem is made up of a wide variety of relationship types, from individual kinship to informal cooperation between organizations, which is an indication it has passed its infancy stage.

The current syndicate, far from a simple one-man operation, involves a heterogeneous variety of individuals and groups engaged in the production, smuggling, and trade of Captagon. The majority of this operation revolves around four key players. The Fourth Armored Division is essential, controlling vast areas of the country and wielding significant military influence. This division was created to be a mightier, alternative military organization than the regular Syrian army, made up of soldiers with unwavering loyalty to Bashar Al-Assad. Primarily composed of the Alawite ethnic group, they have powerful backing from Hezbollah and Iranian militias and are led by Bashar Al-Assad's brother, Maher, who has consistently remained loyal (so far). Equal in importance to the Fourth Armored Division are the National Defence Forces. They were established as another Institution designed to ensure the survival of the Assad Regime, made possible originally by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, modeled after the Basij Militia. They exist to relieve pressure from the weaker Syrian army and to legitimize previously brutal militias that supported Assad, integration achieved by offering these factions military salaries and titles. The Lebanese Hezbollah became involved in the Syrian conflict to assist Assad and to establish parallel institutions. Acting as an Iranian proxy, they view themselves as part of the "Axis of Revolution" alongside Syria and Iran, and thus tend to promote Iranian and anti-American interests. Their involvement is especially noticeable in regions near the Lebanese border. The fourth critical player in this structure is the Military Intelligence Directorate in Syria, which provides a significant hub of actors for the Syrian narcotics network. Except for Hezbollah, which still conducts close coordination with the Fourth Armored Division, each central group directly responds to the presidential palace. Significant overlap and collaboration with Iranian proxies were also noticed. The research identified nine individuals specifically, who play fundamental roles in the captagon trade and have direct familial connections to Bashar Al-Assad. The stability and extent of the current "Captagon Mafia"  shows itself through the fact that some actors are even part of opposition forces like the 3rd Legion of the Syrian National Army (SNA, supported by Turkey), the Syrian Democratic Forces (a coalition of militias supported by the USA), or Bedouin groups (which are pro and anti-Assad).

Unveiling Captagon's Profits: Assessing the Political and Economic Implications

Assessing the overall profitability of the captagon trade conducted by the Assad regime presents unique challenges - from limited consumption data to unreliable seizure records. The prevalent approach in the literature is to calculate the market value based on the available data on pill seizures. However, OPENSYR attempted to quantify the profits that the Syrian regime and Lebanese dealers net.

Captagon's production costs are low, but determining the expenses involved in smuggling and distribution is a complicated task. To address these uncertainties, the researchers established a range of potential profits, averaged over three years. Within this span, approximately 1 billion pills were seized in Arab Asia, with the Syrian regime contributing the majority of the supply. 

The production cost of a single captagon pill is estimated at $0.20, while the average retail price outside of Syria and Lebanon is around $8.00 per pill. The researchers considered different distribution scenarios. In one, they assumed the Assad regime was entirely in charge of the supply chain. In another, they considered the regime responsible for production alone. Furthermore, they estimated that the consumer market was either the same size as the amount of drugs seized or up to three times larger.

After considering these cases, they concluded that the revenue generated from 2020-2022 ranged from $250 million to $21 billion, with a middle point of $2.4 billion per year. While the margin is quite significant, the likelihood of the individual cases differs. Yet in light of the Syrian State income, even revenues in the lower range would pose a significant amount. 

The profits from the captagon trade allow Bashar Al-Assad to accomplish three significant objectives. First, he can maintain the economic stability of his regime. In addition, he can secure the loyalty and support of influential figures in Syria by allowing them to benefit from the narcotics network. Lastly, he can leverage this situation to extract political concessions from countries that are major consumers of captagon. 

Takeaways and personal thoughts

The extent to which captagon continues to be exported and consumed in Arab Asian countries, as well as the wide range of actors in Syria participating in the narcotics ecosystem are worrisome. Bashar Al-Assad has succeeded in creating a profitable motivation for a majority of actors in the Syrian civil war to maintain the status quo and strengthened his influence and political negotiating weight in the Middle East. 

Western and Gulf governments have tackled the issue half-heartedly. Only 10% of identified actors are sanctioned (of which only 25% have been sanctioned specifically for their role in the captagon trade) and neighboring countries to Syria, like Iraq and even Jordan, have been lacking in border control, enabling massive amounts of shipments to pass through easily. While Gulf states try to impose harsh punishments domestically to reduce the impact of captagon, an atmosphere of non-condemnation and silence has been fostered to not step on the Assad regime's toes. 

Another interesting observation is that almost all major actors of the captagon market are strongly affiliated with the IRGC, and thus by implication the Iranian Regime. Coupled with the fact that there is circumstantial evidence of IRGC involvement in further steps of the process like money laundering and sanction circumvention, the bigger picture question of how deeply the Iranian regime is involved in the captagon trade specifically is raised. Aside from the benefit of creating further instability in the region, which has been essential to Iran's foreign policy strategy, a share of the ridiculous profits generated can be a helpful tool for the survival of an economically isolated regime.

Overall, the path to containing the flood of captagon is not clear-cut. Normalization with Assad seems to be the course that Middle Eastern players are set on, and one of the main drivers behind this new course is that they hope secessions to the current regime will put a stop to, or at least curb captagon production. It indeed seems unlikely that targeted sanctions will be able to do the job by themselves. The current structure of the captagon network indicates that it should be able to absorb targeted sanctions regimes against individual actors. Secessions to Assad, however, likely won’t lead to immediate restraint in captagon dealings. While most major actors do stand under the presidential palace's control, it is questionable if a regime that is barely clinging on to power will be able to eradicate or dim one of the nation's biggest industries. Currently, Assad and his allies hold a “monopoly” on the value chain of captagon production, but that could change with other actors emerging. The demand for captagon is obviously present, and even without regime support, Syria still offers ideal conditions for the production and export of narcotics.

There are, however, viable paths to pursue while observing how the narcotics network in Syria will evolve without giving in to the Assad regime. Pressuring neighboring states like Iraq or Jordan, which are the main smuggling routes to the Gulf, to pursue harsher border controls is essential. While the research at OPENSYR has shown that individual sanctions will be futile in the long term, they still can damage and burden the infrastructure of the network. 

Subscribe now

Under Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the governments of Japan and Iran signed a visa-exempt tourism agreement in 1974, which for some reason, lasted well into the Iranian revolution. When the Iran-Iraq war left the Iranian economy in shambles, unskilled laborers migrated to Japan, a country which was just in the middle of an economic boom. The Japanese authorities turned a blind eye to the predominantly illegal labor (as a tourist visa does not permit work) due to the increased demand for workers in construction projects and the unwillingness of the domestic population to take on these jobs. The bubble grows, and in the early ‘90s, the bubble bursts – and suddenly a bunch of Iranians find themselves out of work, in a country which doesn’t really want them. Japan lifted the visa-exempt agreement (and the Iranian government, in its known calm stoic manner, reacted by lifting it as well). With expired visas and without work permits, many Iranians turned to petty crime, or continued to be exploited, and blackmailed, by businesses seeking cheap labor.

As the Iranians that turned to crime didn’t have any connections, or infrastructure in place, they were quickly hired by Japanese organized crime. The “Chinpira”, the lowest ranks of the Yakuza, used Iranians to do their bidding. However, the Iranians were never full-fledged members of the Yakuza, as the group is highly “patriotic”, and would never fully initiate a foreigner. In their own words:

“That's why in our industry (Yakuza), we say "Irapaki" to refer to dirty foreigners. [ed: “Irapaki” referring to Iranians and Pakistanis]”^[1]

The low-level Iranian criminals would sell counterfeit telephone cards, which could be used to make international calls at a fraction of the price, or, who would have thought, they would also engage in drug trafficking.

Over time, the Iranian community in Japan, or at least the remnants of the illegal workforce that came chasing the quick money and found themselves stranded in a country that harbors resentment towards them, became organized. They are primarily located in the Tokyo metropolitan area, with some reaching out to the Kansai region. Their influence, or at least their willingness to act, has also increased. This was proven by a murder case that described the perpetrators, as well as the victim, as members of a gang primarily composed of Iranians^[2]. Because of the Iranian drug dealers' blatant advertising in public space, they are also involved in turf wars, one of them on the infamous Shibuya crossing^[3]. Crime statistics from the National Japanese Police indicate that arrests of Iranian criminals have gone down over the last years, although they still hover in the hundreds.

Except for the occasional case file, not much is reported on their more recent activity, which leaves me wondering as to the current situation of the “Iranian crime syndicate” in Japan. They are simply referred to as passers-by, in statistics or as anecdotes of the problem with illegal immigrants in Japan.