A deep dive into the Syrian Narcotics Ecosystem

A small pill is holding the entire Middle East in its hand, and a notorious dictator is producing it on an assembly line

In the span of only a few years, a pill trading under the name captagon¹ has overtaken hashish as the most prevalent drug throughout Arab Asia. Several media outlets have linked the trade and production of the pill to the regime of Bashar Al-Assad^[2], but it was the Observatory of Political and Economic Networks in Syria (OPENSYR) that came out with an extensive analysis of the Middle East’s captagon trade (which you can find here), filling a gap in literature and providing comprehensive insight into the issue. In this article we will explore their findings (with small substitutions) to get a comprehensive overview of the novel drug and the conspiracy surrounding it.

From Pharmaceutical Wonder to Illicit Stimulant

Captagon was originally the brand name for Fenethylline, a chemical first synthesized in West Germany in the early 1960s. It was a combination of amphetamine and theophylline^[3], created as an alternative to the known stimulants at the time. It was primarily prescribed to treat ADHD, but it quickly found favor among students as a “smart drug” – marketed for its supposed lack of common side effects seen with similar substances. At one point, it was said that every other soccer player in the German Bundesliga was using captagon^[4]. However, by the late 1980s, it became clear that captagon had an incredibly addictive nature and led to harmful side effects, such as the gradual decay of personality/consciousness, hallucinations, and even death, which is why it got banned in most countries^[5]. The illegally manufactured and sold captagon pills found on the market today are quite different from the original formulation, with Fenethylline no longer a component. Instead, they are mainly made up of amphetamines and caffeine, although their exact composition tends to vary. The appearance of these pills can change, but they are typically recognizable by the distinct “C” imprint on each pill. This unique marking has earned the pills the nickname “Abu Hilalein,” which translates to “father of two crescents^[6].”

Examining the captagon trade in Arab Asia

To truly understand the scope of the captagon trade in Arab Asia, the team at OPENSYR took it upon themselves to construct an independent database of drug seizures throughout the region. This step became necessary as the data reported by governments to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)—often the primary source for such information—tends to be incomplete or inaccurate, as they rely on comprehensive reports from the individual governments. OPENSYR put together individual reports by organizations in order to circumvent this process. To gauge the prevalence of different narcotics, we operate under the assumption that each drug has an equal chance of being intercepted.

Figure 1 | The graph shows the amount of seizures for each year for the most common drugs in the region of Arab Asia. Observatory of Political and Economic Networks, June 2023.

Figure 1 reveals a telling shift in the Middle East’s drug landscape. Historically, cannabis resin (hashish) reigned as the undisputed substance of choice. Yet, in recent years, captagon has surged, claiming the top spot alongside hashish. This immense growth is not just a statistical quirk; it speaks volumes when analyzed alongside data from addiction treatment facilities. A staggering 58% of addicts seeking treatment in Saudi Arabia are grappling with amphetamine-related addictions, highlighting the pervasive grip of captagon. The narcotic’s consumption and subsequent addiction can lead to devastating health effects. Furthermore, the chemical inconsistency of these pills, which are not always only laced with caffeine and can sometimes even contain methamphetamine, poses its own danger^[7]. 

In the comprehensive database compiled by researchers, not all drug seizures specify a country of origin. OPENSYR examined 111 seizures logged between 2016 and 2022 that did indicate this piece of information. 54% of these instances traced the drugs back to regime-held areas in Syria, 6% to Lebanon, and 4.5% to either of the locations. Moreover, the trail becomes even clearer with captagon: a staggering 86% of seizures are linked to either regime-held Syria or Lebanon, with a definitive 72% traced back to Syrian regions under government control, leaving 14% undetermined. It is clear the organizations responsible for the publication of seizures have become increasingly wary in reporting this crucial information. This trend could indicate smugglers’ improved skill in disguising their sources, or it may stem from shifts in domestic policy to avoid intense scrutiny on the parties responsible for the captagon boom. 

So, why do Lebanon and Syria emerge as central figures in Middle Eastern drug production?
Several factors compound to create a perfect storm for illicit manufacturing. Both countries’ battered economies translate into lower production costs, thanks to cheaper labor. The rampant corruption and lax enforcement of laws, in contrast to the rigorous crackdowns on illegal drugs in Gulf nations, provide a breeding ground for organized criminal activities. The official stance of the Syrian government is that “terrorist” groups within the country are responsible for the growing narcotics trade, using it as a source of funding for their operations. Supposedly, national defense forces have uncovered copious amounts of drugs while seizing areas held by these “terrorists.” However, we have already discovered that most narcotics seizures in Arab Asia are traced back to the regime-held Syria, which indicates that the narrative spread by the Syrian regime is highly questionable. 

Captagon production in Syria

The team at OPENSYR has identified 36 key production hubs of captagon, all located within Syria. It is important to mention that some smaller facilities are significantly mobile, often shifting between the Syrian-Lebanese border when there is an elevated risk of getting caught. However, most of these hubs continue to operate within Syria’s borders.

Figure 2 | Map of Syria and its governorates, with the three most relevant ones to captagon production highlighted in blue.

The Daraa government in the south of the country is home to the highest number of captagon-production facilities. Following the Assad regime's recapture of this province in 2018, the number of these facilities has noticeably increased. Daraa is an attractive location because of its uncertain security arrangements, established smuggling networks across the desert border with Jordan, and proximity to consumers in the Gulf. The local parties involved in production and smuggling include the Lebanese Hezbollah and affiliates of the Fourth Armored Division.

In eastern Syria, the Dayr al-Zowr government has become the second-largest center for captagon production due to its proximity to Iraq. Not only does Iraq serve as an alternative smuggling route, but it has also emerged as a significant market for captagon consumption. The Al-Qaim highway, connecting Syria to Iraq, is primarily controlled by Iranian-backed militias, historically known for their involvement in smuggling activities. Given the influence of these militias in both Iraqi and Syrian territories, it's highly likely they are involved in the production and distribution of captagon in the region.

Activities in Homs, which borders Lebanon, have declined as attention has shifted to the other two governorates. The Lebanese Hezbollah and the Fourth Armored Division have a significant influence in this region.

Almost all related facilities are located in regions controlled by organizations that maintain strong alliances with the Syrian regime. Crucial entities such as the Fourth Armored Division, National Defence Forces, and the Military Intelligence Directorate operate under the direct influence of the President. Additionally, the Lebanese Hezbollah, which is a major player in the captagon production, even though ostensibly independent, closely coordinates its activities with the Fourth Armored Division—overseen by Maher al-Assad, the President's brother. The involvement of Iranian-backed militias is noteworthy as well, which prompts critical questions about the depth of the Iranian government's involvement. Possessing vast experience in circumnavigating sanctions and laundering money, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxies could serve as beneficial allies to the captagon syndicate. 

It is worth noting there is one production facility in the Idlib governorate, overseen by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and another four in areas controlled by the Syrian National Army (SNA). Both HTS and SNA are key opposition forces in the Syrian civil war against the Assad regime.

Mapping Syria's Narcotics Network

The second independent database by OPENSYR includes all significant participants in Syria's captagon supply chain, with some involvement from Lebanon. The network has 330 “nodes,” representing private companies, government organizations, customs agents, businesspeople, money launderers, and militias. It also has 458 “edges” representing the connections between these nodes. This approach not only helps pinpoint the main players in the captagon supply chain but highlights the growth stages of the country's narcotics ecosystem by studying the types of relationships formed.

Without identifying a specific timeline, the research posits that the origins of the current narcotics ecosystem can likely be traced back to a small subset of individuals. These initial actors may have received support from authoritative groups such as the Fourth Armored Division, suggesting a close connection between the narcotics trade and Syrian established powers. As time passed, the network expanded, enticing and incorporating other local and marginalized actors. These new relationships were informal and cooperative, pointing towards a network built on shared interests and partnerships. Within this growing ecosystem, certain partnerships evolved dynamically and autonomously, manifesting a degree of flexibility and adaptability. As the ecosystem matured, specific dynamics that contributed toward a more cohesive and developed system surfaced. The presence of power-packed central actors (like Wassem Al-Assad, who plays a role in financing, logistics, and operations), diverse types of players involved (like actors on opposing sides of the Syrian civil war), and the emergence of functional subgroups underscore this stability. Today, the ecosystem is made up of a wide variety of relationship types, from individual kinship to informal cooperation between organizations, which is an indication it has passed its infancy stage.

The current syndicate, far from a simple one-man operation, involves a heterogeneous variety of individuals and groups engaged in the production, smuggling, and trade of Captagon. The majority of this operation revolves around four key players. The Fourth Armored Division is essential, controlling vast areas of the country and wielding significant military influence. This division was created to be a mightier, alternative military organization than the regular Syrian army, made up of soldiers with unwavering loyalty to Bashar Al-Assad. Primarily composed of the Alawite ethnic group, they have powerful backing from Hezbollah and Iranian militias and are led by Bashar Al-Assad's brother, Maher, who has consistently remained loyal (so far). Equal in importance to the Fourth Armored Division are the National Defence Forces. They were established as another Institution designed to ensure the survival of the Assad Regime, made possible originally by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, modeled after the Basij Militia. They exist to relieve pressure from the weaker Syrian army and to legitimize previously brutal militias that supported Assad, integration achieved by offering these factions military salaries and titles. The Lebanese Hezbollah became involved in the Syrian conflict to assist Assad and to establish parallel institutions. Acting as an Iranian proxy, they view themselves as part of the "Axis of Revolution" alongside Syria and Iran, and thus tend to promote Iranian and anti-American interests. Their involvement is especially noticeable in regions near the Lebanese border. The fourth critical player in this structure is the Military Intelligence Directorate in Syria, which provides a significant hub of actors for the Syrian narcotics network. Except for Hezbollah, which still conducts close coordination with the Fourth Armored Division, each central group directly responds to the presidential palace. Significant overlap and collaboration with Iranian proxies were also noticed. The research identified nine individuals specifically, who play fundamental roles in the captagon trade and have direct familial connections to Bashar Al-Assad. The stability and extent of the current "Captagon Mafia"  shows itself through the fact that some actors are even part of opposition forces like the 3rd Legion of the Syrian National Army (SNA, supported by Turkey), the Syrian Democratic Forces (a coalition of militias supported by the USA), or Bedouin groups (which are pro and anti-Assad).

Unveiling Captagon's Profits: Assessing the Political and Economic Implications

Assessing the overall profitability of the captagon trade conducted by the Assad regime presents unique challenges - from limited consumption data to unreliable seizure records. The prevalent approach in the literature is to calculate the market value based on the available data on pill seizures. However, OPENSYR attempted to quantify the profits that the Syrian regime and Lebanese dealers net.

Captagon's production costs are low, but determining the expenses involved in smuggling and distribution is a complicated task. To address these uncertainties, the researchers established a range of potential profits, averaged over three years. Within this span, approximately 1 billion pills were seized in Arab Asia, with the Syrian regime contributing the majority of the supply. 

The production cost of a single captagon pill is estimated at $0.20, while the average retail price outside of Syria and Lebanon is around $8.00 per pill. The researchers considered different distribution scenarios. In one, they assumed the Assad regime was entirely in charge of the supply chain. In another, they considered the regime responsible for production alone. Furthermore, they estimated that the consumer market was either the same size as the amount of drugs seized or up to three times larger.

After considering these cases, they concluded that the revenue generated from 2020-2022 ranged from $250 million to $21 billion, with a middle point of $2.4 billion per year. While the margin is quite significant, the likelihood of the individual cases differs. Yet in light of the Syrian State income, even revenues in the lower range would pose a significant amount. 

The profits from the captagon trade allow Bashar Al-Assad to accomplish three significant objectives. First, he can maintain the economic stability of his regime. In addition, he can secure the loyalty and support of influential figures in Syria by allowing them to benefit from the narcotics network. Lastly, he can leverage this situation to extract political concessions from countries that are major consumers of captagon. 

Takeaways and personal thoughts

The extent to which captagon continues to be exported and consumed in Arab Asian countries, as well as the wide range of actors in Syria participating in the narcotics ecosystem are worrisome. Bashar Al-Assad has succeeded in creating a profitable motivation for a majority of actors in the Syrian civil war to maintain the status quo and strengthened his influence and political negotiating weight in the Middle East. 

Western and Gulf governments have tackled the issue half-heartedly. Only 10% of identified actors are sanctioned (of which only 25% have been sanctioned specifically for their role in the captagon trade) and neighboring countries to Syria, like Iraq and even Jordan, have been lacking in border control, enabling massive amounts of shipments to pass through easily. While Gulf states try to impose harsh punishments domestically to reduce the impact of captagon, an atmosphere of non-condemnation and silence has been fostered to not step on the Assad regime's toes. 

Another interesting observation is that almost all major actors of the captagon market are strongly affiliated with the IRGC, and thus by implication the Iranian Regime. Coupled with the fact that there is circumstantial evidence of IRGC involvement in further steps of the process like money laundering and sanction circumvention, the bigger picture question of how deeply the Iranian regime is involved in the captagon trade specifically is raised. Aside from the benefit of creating further instability in the region, which has been essential to Iran's foreign policy strategy, a share of the ridiculous profits generated can be a helpful tool for the survival of an economically isolated regime.

Overall, the path to containing the flood of captagon is not clear-cut. Normalization with Assad seems to be the course that Middle Eastern players are set on, and one of the main drivers behind this new course is that they hope secessions to the current regime will put a stop to, or at least curb captagon production. It indeed seems unlikely that targeted sanctions will be able to do the job by themselves. The current structure of the captagon network indicates that it should be able to absorb targeted sanctions regimes against individual actors. Secessions to Assad, however, likely won’t lead to immediate restraint in captagon dealings. While most major actors do stand under the presidential palace's control, it is questionable if a regime that is barely clinging on to power will be able to eradicate or dim one of the nation's biggest industries. Currently, Assad and his allies hold a “monopoly” on the value chain of captagon production, but that could change with other actors emerging. The demand for captagon is obviously present, and even without regime support, Syria still offers ideal conditions for the production and export of narcotics.

There are, however, viable paths to pursue while observing how the narcotics network in Syria will evolve without giving in to the Assad regime. Pressuring neighboring states like Iraq or Jordan, which are the main smuggling routes to the Gulf, to pursue harsher border controls is essential. While the research at OPENSYR has shown that individual sanctions will be futile in the long term, they still can damage and burden the infrastructure of the network. 

1. “Captagon” with capital “C” references the brand-name and original drug, “captagon” with lowercase “c” references the modern reinterpretation of the drug trading under the same name